Complexity and Social Networks Blog: Networked government

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14 November 2005

Networked government

There is a recent and increasing literature on networks and government that makes a strong case that much of what government does actually involves a complex interlocking of government (and nongovernment) actors. A key question, as ideas around “networked government�? are explored, is how to draw on the rich research vein on inter-organizational networks that currently exists, most/much of which focuses on the intersection of networks and markets (economic sociology)? In short, in what ways are intergovernmental networks different, in what ways are they the same? A few differences to begin with:

(1) Governmental entities often have a monopoly over their domain. Much of the economic sociology literature effectively relies on exit (the market) to make the network (pre-existing ties) powerful—I cease to do business with you because you behaved badly with me (relational embeddedness) or someone else I know (structural embeddedness).

(2) There is less flexibility to organizational boundaries—e.g., given high levels of interdependence and potential opportunism, in the market one firm can merge with another, which is often impossible in the governmental setting.

(3) There are often limits on exchange—e.g., often it is not possible for one agency to pay another to help it achieve its policy objectives.

See the slides from this talk, listen to the podcast or watch the Video (WMV 320x240).

Posted by David Lazer at November 14, 2005 10:01 AM

Comments

Okay, I'll start...

I disagree with your characterization of the econ-soc literature as saying that the power of networks is generated by the ability to exit the network / exchange.

For example, Brian Uzzi's work on embeddedness in the garment industry did discuss exit, but as an illustration of the power of networks (e.g., exiting parties with the opportunity and incentive to "behave badly" did not).

In your talk, you mentioned the benefits of being located in an arbiting network position, a la Burt's work. This does not rely on exit, but can be seen as a type silo-spanning way of generating importance.

Finally, in addition to certain aspects of government displaying monopoly-like characteristics, other aspects of government can display monopsony-type characteristics, where the government is the only purchaser. The DoD, NSF, are a couple of examples. The effectiveness of spreading affirmative action and other policies through industry by requiring them of federal contractors provides an illustration of the network dynamics working in the other direction.

No surprise that all is more complex...

Posted by: B. Rubineau at November 14, 2005 10:01 PM

Hmmm, let me push back on the exit issue. I think that the possibility of exit intrinsically changes the nature of the interaction, and I think there is both game theoretic and experimental evidence to this effect (e.g. pd with exit or without exit). Whether exit is exercised in a particular situation at all does not mean that exit has not affected the nature of the interactions.

Re the boundary spanning, I would agree that the nature of information access is likely similar in both govt and market domains, although the potential for arbitrage is likely fundamentally different.

I agree re monopsony role of govt; seems similar to me, actually, in the role that certain firms play-- e.g., the big 3 auto companies and suppliers of auto parts, etc.

david

Posted by: David Lazer at November 15, 2005 6:43 PM

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