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30 January 2006
Before I leave the NSA thread, one more thought about the utility of the data mining phone log data, recording phone calls, etc. It is important to note that pattern recognition is only as powerful as the ancillary intelligence that the government would have to complement the phone data. Obviously, in the absence of any indications of who is high risk, the signal in the data is infinitesmal.
A corollary to this is that pattern recognition of today's data will be much more effective in the future-- because the amount of complementary information will only go up. We may have no reason to pay attention to Joe, except that he was 3 degrees removed from someone in some terrorist's phonebook. However, in the future we may receive solid intelligence that Joe is a terrorist. At that point, it would be a pretty good idea to go through all of the data you collected about Joe-- if you have it sitting in a hard drive somewhere. If you haven't been recording, and collecting information from the switches, etc, it may be impossible to reconstruct afterwards. That is, "retrospective" pattern analysis is likely to be much more effective than prospective pattern analysis. Of course, this in turn points to a strategy of collecting data now and asking questions later, which again brings us back to the issues around privacy and collateral usage in aces.
Posted by David Lazer at January 30, 2006 2:29 PM