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30 January 2006
Before I leave the NSA thread, one more thought about the utility of the data mining phone log data, recording phone calls, etc. It is important to note that pattern recognition is only as powerful as the ancillary intelligence that the government would have to complement the phone data. Obviously, in the absence of any indications of who is high risk, the signal in the data is infinitesmal.
A corollary to this is that pattern recognition of today's data will be much more effective in the future-- because the amount of complementary information will only go up. We may have no reason to pay attention to Joe, except that he was 3 degrees removed from someone in some terrorist's phonebook. However, in the future we may receive solid intelligence that Joe is a terrorist. At that point, it would be a pretty good idea to go through all of the data you collected about Joe-- if you have it sitting in a hard drive somewhere. If you haven't been recording, and collecting information from the switches, etc, it may be impossible to reconstruct afterwards. That is, "retrospective" pattern analysis is likely to be much more effective than prospective pattern analysis. Of course, this in turn points to a strategy of collecting data now and asking questions later, which again brings us back to the issues around privacy and collateral usage in aces.
Posted by David Lazer at January 30, 2006 2:29 PM
This is the primary motivation / justification for the closed circuit TV monitoring trend in the UK and elsewhere (some reports have the number of CCTV cameras in the UK at 4 million). The privacy balance is found in the policies that call for the destruction of tape after n days, during which relevant footage can be analyzed in the event of an incident. This helped British investigators learn a lot about the events immediately preceding the bombing last fall.
Long term data analysis had the advantage that it can be similarly governed by good policy. Databases can be encrypted to allow for access control and access auditing to protect against unwarranted use and mining. The crypto community has plenty of tools that allow limited access under different conditions.
Of course, absent any regulations, the data is stored decentralized, under whatever protections the (ISPs / phone companies / etc) have in place. Over the past few months we've seen various reactions to these companies turning over records to investigators. The advantage of retrospective analysis is that the arguments for secrecy are weaker, and therefore a better case can be made for, if not privacy protection, then at least transparency and due process.
Posted by: allan at January 30, 2006 5:52 PM
Notably, as Laszlo Barabasi pointed out to me today, last month the EU passed the Data Retention Directive, which directs a variety of information intermediaries (phone companies, ISPs) to save phone log data, etc, for a fixed period of time to allow for retrospective analysis of communication data by the government. I have not seen an analysis of what grounds are necessary for government access to these data.
Posted by: David Lazer at January 30, 2006 11:17 PM