Political Behavior Blog

I very much enjoyed this paper, and the opportunity to think through how public opinion might vary in the context of a relatively stable domination by one party. In some ways, the public opinion time series is comparable to the U.S. case, where approval of the President varies far more widely than party identification. Here's my question, though: what role do elections play in the cycles described by the paper? In the American context, we would expect that attitudes about the parties and the administration become more important and more stable right before an election, after considerable public debate. The paper argues that party leaders shuffle cabinets or drop Prime Ministers when their popularity dips well below that of the party, but could the proximity of elections induce this at all? I'd be curious to know how the timing of elections interact with the argument being made.

A good question that I only have anecdotal evidence to address. When Koizumi called the most recent election, his approval ratings rose 14 points the LDP's rose 7 points. This is an unusual case, but it suggests that party leaders might use elections to create as well as take advantage of their popularity.