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« Mind the Coding | Main | Political Statistics Blogs »

28 September 2006

Causation and Manipulation

Jim Greiner

In a 1986 JASA article, Paul Holland reported that he and Don Rubin had once made up the motto, “NO CAUSATION WITHOUT MANIPULATION.” The idea is that even in an observational study, causal inference cannot proceed unless and until the quantitative analyst identifies an intervention that hypothetically could be implemented (although Professor Holland accepts the idea that the manipulation may be not ever be carried out for physical or ethical reasons). The idea of studying the causal effect of things that we as human beings could never influence is incoherent because such things could never be the subject of a randomized experiment.

My question: do we really adhere to this principle? Take the one causal link established via observational studies that pretty much everyone (even Professor Freedman, see below) agrees on: smoking causes lung cancer. Has anyone ever bothered to imagine what manipulation to make people smoke is contemplated? Aren’t we pretty sure it wouldn’t matter how we intervened, i.e., however it happens that people smoke, those who smoke get lung cancer at a higher rate? (It might matter what they smoke, how much they smoke, perhaps even where and when, but what got them started and what keeps them at it?) If folks agree with me on this, what’s left of Professor Holland’s maxim?

Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. Am. Stat. Ass’n 945, 959 (1986)

David Freedman, From Association to Causation: Some Remarks on the History of Statistics, 14 Stat. Sci. 243, 253 (1999)

Posted by James Greiner at September 28, 2006 11:00 PM

Comments

Has anyone ever bothered to imagine what manipulation to make people smoke is contemplated?

Sure. You can give away cigarettes for free? You can feature glamorous actors smoking in movies? You can allow smoking in places, like military boot camp, where it is current forbidden. In the extreme, you could force prisoners to smoke by withholding food until they do. There are many other possible examples.

The point of NO CAUSATION WITHOUT MANIPULATION is that a lot of silly people pretend that things like race and sex (essentially impossible to change) are plausible "causes" of this or that. They aren't. Thinking about things you can't, even in theory, change as causes is unhelpful.

Perhaps I am missing your point.

Posted by: David Kane at October 2, 2006 10:58 AM

Actually, I don't think you're missing the point at all, just disagreeing with it, which is certainly fair enough. My question is now this: when people say "smoking causes lung cancer," do they really mean that giving cigarettes away causes lung cancer, or advertising causes lung cancer? I don't think so. Rather, I think those making this statement are assuming (in this instance, fairly plausibly) that it doesn't matter what induces people to smoke. Thus, there is an assumption that the outcome (lung cancer) is invariant to the nature of the intervention, as long as that intervention "works" in the sense of getting people to smoke. If those making this assumption are right, then I think Professor Holland's maxim is too broad.

By the way, because I'm on the blog panel, I know that there's a lot more forthcoming on this point. And you've anticipated where some of this is going: the "holy grail" of causation as relates to race/gender/national origin, etc. As a preview: in most, perhaps all, legal settings, what matters is what people perceive a person's race to be, not what it actually is (even if we could all agree on what that meant). And perceptions can be changed.

Posted by: Jim at October 2, 2006 2:52 PM