Every year, members of Congress buy and sell over $900 million in stock --
almost $2 million per member. In this paper, we examine an extensive,
newly-collected dataset of members' stock trades between 2004 and 2006 in
order to assess the extent to which political factors are reflected in
members' investment behavior. Broadly speaking, members of Congress have two
kinds of relationships with public firms: as the principals of electoral
campaigns, members are "supplicants," asking firms and corporate executives
for financial and electoral support; as legislators and committee members,
they are "overlords," shaping the regulatory environment firms face. These
two roles suggest different investment patterns we might expect to see in
members' personal accounts. "Supplicants" may use their investment
portfolios to bond themselves to the interests of constituent firms, where
the primary purpose of the investment is not financial but political.
"Overlords" may use their advance knowledge of regulatory changes to make
personal gains, and they may find themselves receiving stock tips from firms
eager for political favors. Members in either role may acquire valuable
market information in the course of interacting with firms.

Using our data, which covers over 50,000 stock trades and is augmented with
members' relationships to firms through constituencies, campaign
contributions, and committee assignments, we pose a number of questions
designed to illuminate political stock trading. Do members of Congress
generally outperform the market? Do they focus a disproportionate amount of
their investments on firms in their constituencies, overseen by committees
on which they sit, or on their donor lists? Do they outperform or
underperform the market on these "connected trades"? Do the results vary by
party, seniority, or industry?

The answers to these questions will help us understand, among other things,
1) the extent to which members of Congress derive personal financial
benefits from office through their investment accounts, 2) the extent to
which insider political information is valuable in financial markets, and 3)
the extent to which politicians use their investments to signal their
commitment to particular constituent interests.

Note: We will be meeting every Friday from Noon-1:30 in Littauer M-17. Food and refreshments will be provided.

Welcome to another exciting year of the workshop! The workshop provides a forum for all graduate students in government, economics, and PEG to discuss their research related to political economy. As the primary purpose of the workshop is to serve as an informal forum for graduate students, papers on other topics are also welcome. We welcome presentations of research at various levels of completion, from proposals to polished papers. Refer to our Guidelines for more information on the topics and format of the workshop

Andrew Eggers and Eleanor Powell G1, Government Trends in OECD Capital Taxation

Note: We will be meeting every Friday from Noon-1:30 in Littauer M-17. Food and refreshments will be provided.

Welcome to another exciting year of the workshop! The workshop provides a forum for all graduate students in government, economics, and PEG to discuss their research related to political economy. As the primary purpose of the workshop is to serve as an informal forum for graduate students, papers on other topics are also welcome. We welcome presentations of research at various levels of completion, from proposals to polished papers. Refer to our Guidelines for more information on the topics and format of the workshop

Erin M Simpson Government, G3 Civil Wars and Military Strategy