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X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:Political Economy Workshop (Gov 3007)
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SUMMARY:Political Economy Workshop (Gov 3007)
DESCRIPTION:Presentations given by Eduardo Teso and Kara Ross CamarenaFirst, Kara Ross Camarena will present her paper "Increasing Refugee Flows: The Cost of Intervening in a Neighboring Country’s Civil War," with Soeren Henn as discussant.Second, Edoardo Teso will present a work in progress titled "The Role of Corporate Elites in Campaign Finance: Evidence from Directors of U.S. Public Firms." He wrote a 4-page memo about the project, which is attached here.Please also find Kara's abstract below and paper attached. Hope to see many of you there.Abstract for "Increasing Refugee Flows: The Cost of Intervening in a Neighboring Country’s Civil War"A growing literature in international security examines transnational dimensions of civil war. This has occurred as scholars realize that governments and rebel groups alike court military and financial support from external sources, including neighbor- ing governments, exiled diaspora and like-minded rebel groups abroad. I add to this literature by exploring a distinct channel of transnational relations in civil war, the strategic choices of refugee recipient countries. By exploring the government of the asylum country as a strategic agent with preferences over refugee influx and the out- come of a the neighboring country’s civil war, I highlight a means of intervening in civil war. A border refugee camp represents an indirect intervention in a civil war and I further study the option in comparison to a conventional military intervention. I ar- gue that refugee camps placed along the border with rebel controlled territory, are an additional technology of war for the rebel group, giving the rebel group an advantage in fighting the civil war. The asylum country considers the implications for a border camp in the neighboring country’s civil war, and its preferences over the outcome of neighboring country’s civil war when choosing its refugee policy. Furthermore, when, for geographic or domestic reasons, a refugee recipient country cannot optimally choose border refugee camps, it may opt for direct military intervention. Collectively these interventions increase armed activity, providing an explanation for more intense and longer civil wars. In fact, when the marginal cost of hosting additional refugees is sufficiently low, a country of asylum will rationally act in a manner that increases their refugee population.
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DTSTART:20150427T160000Z
DTEND:20150427T180000Z
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