Michael Gibilisco (California Institute of Technology), "The Point of Attack: Where and Why Does Oil Cause Armed Conflict in Africa" (w/ Graeme Blair and Darin Christensen)
Oil revenues constitute a lucrative prize, motivating armed groups to fight for control of resource-rich territory. Yet, we demonstrate, armed groups rarely attack sites with the most oil: oil fields and terminals. To explain this finding, we develop a new model with elements of crisis-bargaining and Blotto games. We use data on the location of oil infrastructure and armed conflict events to assess the implications of the model. Overall, we argue that groups sabotage pipelines because they expect these sites to be vulnerable and disruption can compel governments to address their demands.
Co-sponsored by FAS and IQSS, the Alberto Alesina Seminar on Political Economy supports research-related activities that integrate the study of economics and politics, whether by studying economic behavior in the political process or political behavior in the marketplace. In general, positive political economy is concerned with showing how observed differences among institutions affect political and economic outcomes in various social, economic, and political systems and how the institutions themselves change and develop in response to individual and collective beliefs, preferences, and strategies.
Zoom links for the Alesina Seminar are distributed via the seminar's mailing list. You can subscribe to the Alesina Seminar Mailing List here.
See the seminar's full schedule at the Alesina Seminar page.
All interested faculty and students are invited to attend.
LOCATION:CGIS Knafel, room K050 STATUS:CONFIRMED DTSTART:20230427T203000Z DTEND:20230427T214500Z END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR