Tim Besley (London School of Economics), "An Economic Model of Deliberative Democracy"
This paper develops a canonical model of deliberative democracy as part of a policy process. It studies how deliberation affects incentives and behavior in three contexts: (i) compliance with policies (ii) equilibrium policy choices in a representative democracy and (iii) incentives to protest. The paper explores whether there are welfare gains from increased deliberation and how these depend on changes in equilibrium behavior.
Co-sponsored by FAS and IQSS, the Alberto Alesina Seminar on Political Economy supports research-related activities that integrate the study of economics and politics, whether by studying economic behavior in the political process or political behavior in the marketplace. In general, positive political economy is concerned with showing how observed differences among institutions affect political and economic outcomes in various social, economic, and political systems and how the institutions themselves change and develop in response to individual and collective beliefs, preferences, and strategies.
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All interested faculty and students are invited to attend.
LOCATION:Littauer 301 (Hansen-Mason Lounge) STATUS:CONFIRMED DTSTART:20231012T203000Z DTEND:20231012T214500Z END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR