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X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:Georgy Egorov (Alesina Seminar)
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SUMMARY:Georgy Egorov (Alesina Seminar)
DESCRIPTION:<p>See the seminar's full schedule here:&nbsp;<a href="/node/1442048" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="0e0fca9f-5468-4b4d-9223-05d122937615" data-entity-substitution="canonical">Alberto Alesina Seminar on Political Economy</a></p><h2><strong>Today's Speaker</strong></h2><p>Georgy Egorov (Northwestern),&nbsp;“I'd Be Surprisingly Good for You: Political Information and Network Effects” (with Sergei Guriev, Maxim Mironov, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya)</p><h2><strong>Abstract</strong></h2><p>We use a randomized experiment to assess the impact of a political information campaign on voters who were directly exposed to it and on other voters in their neighborhood (the direct and indirect effects, respectively). During the 2023 presidential elections in Argentina, Javier Milei proposed, among other things, replacing free public education with a voucher system. Following his success in the August 2023 PASO primaries, we sent leaflets providing fact-checking information on the consequences of Milei's policy proposals to a subset of voters in Salta Province, where Milei had the largest vote share in the PASO. Argentina's reporting system and our experimental design enable us to estimate both the direct and indirect effects of the campaign. The campaign reduced support among leaflet recipients (direct effect), but it increased support for him among their neighbors (indirect effect), with the indirect effect strong enough to boost Milei's overall performance. These outcomes persisted in the runoff elections. We replicated the experiment with a different sample of subjects in the runoff and obtained similar results. The paper makes a methodological contribution by estimating within-neighborhood indirect effects using official election results. Our study shows that direct and indirect effects may have opposite signs, and it has implications for how and why information campaigns may backfire.<!--break--></p><p><em>Co-sponsored by FAS and IQSS, the Alberto Alesina Seminar on Political Economy supports research-related activities that integrate the study of economics and politics, whether by studying economic behavior in the political process or political behavior in the marketplace. In general, positive political economy is concerned with showing how observed differences among institutions affect political and economic outcomes in various social, economic, and political systems and how the institutions themselves change and develop in response to individual and collective beliefs, preferences, and strategies</em>.</p><p>Zoom links for the Alesina Seminar are distributed via the seminar's mailing list. You can <a href="https://lists.iq.harvard.edu/mailman/listinfo/ppe_list">subscribe to the Alesina Seminar Mailing List</a> here.</p><p>See the seminar's full schedule at the <a href="/node/1442048" data-entity-type="node" data-entity-uuid="0e0fca9f-5468-4b4d-9223-05d122937615" data-entity-substitution="canonical">Alesina Seminar page</a>.</p><p>All interested faculty and students are invited to attend.</p>
LOCATION:Baker Library, room 102
STATUS:CONFIRMED
DTSTART:20250306T213000Z
DTEND:20250306T224500Z
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