Harvard Seminar on Positive Political Economy

Date: 

Thursday, November 12, 2015, 4:30pm to 6:00pm

Location: 

K354, CGIS Knafel 1737 Cambridge St, Cambridge MA
The Faculty of Arts and Sciences and The Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University are sponsoring a seminar on formal and quantitative political research. The Program on Positive Political Economy (PPE) supports research-related activities that integrate the study of economics and politics, whether by studying economic behavior in the political process or political behavior in the marketplace. In general, positive political economy is concerned with showing how observed differences among institutions affect political and economic outcomes in various social, economic, and political systems and how the institutions themselves change and develop in response to individual and collective beliefs, preferences, and strategies. All interested faculty and students are invited to attend. Professor Micael Castanheira will be presenting, "Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory." Authors:Laurent Bouton, Micael Castanheira, Aniol Llorente-Saguer Abstract: The rational-voter model is often criticized on the grounds that two of its central predictions (the paradox of voting and Duverger's Law) are at odds with reality. Recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an (arguably unrealistic) assumption: the absence of aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the electorate. In this paper, we propose direct empirical evidence of the effect of aggregate uncertainty in multicandidate elections. Adopting a theory-based experimental approach, we explore whether aggregate uncertainty indeed favors the emergence of non-Duverger's law equilibria in plurality elections. Our experimental results support the main theoretical predictions: sincere voting is a predominant strategy under aggregate uncertainty, whereas without aggregate uncertainty, voters massively coordinate their votes behind one candidate, who wins almost surely. Link to the paper: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bz5FsmTgXWM2Q1A5aWdIVVBkVHc/view