Aleksandra Conevska (Applied Stats Workshop)

Speaker & Title

Aleksandra Conevska (Harvard), "Electoral Accountability and Industrial Change: Regulator Selection and Alternative Energy Growth"

Abstract

Regulators play an important role in public policy and existing research indicates that their influence over outcomes depends on how they are selected, where elected regulators yield more consumer-oriented policies. I study regulator selection in a more complex world that better characterizes economies today. Industrial change creates new interest group alliances so regulators no longer face clear pro-business incentives when appointed and pro-consumer when elected. Focusing on the electricity sector, I argue electoral accountability yields regulators who are less likely to promote renewable energy growth and provide evidence that in the US, elected regulators generate significantly less electricity from renewable sources. I argue this is because green interest groups are far more productive at lobbying than electoral campaigning, allowing them greater influence when regulators are insulated from voters. I analyze regulatory lobbying from 2000-2024 and show that green NGOs devote substantially more resources to lobbying than campaigning. Despite their grassroots nature, green NGOs behave a lot more like what we might expect of classic corporate interests. My findings indicate that electoral accountability may not produce the best long-term outcomes for consumers when outcomes involve complex temporal trade-offs. As a result, consumer advocacy groups strategically turn away from citizens and toward insulated policymaking venues.