Christopher Kenny (Applied Stats)

Today's Speaker

Christopher Kenny (Department of Government) presents a hybrid of two papers "Principles and Politics: Explicit Rules Bind Lawmakers and Courts" and "Redistricting Reforms Reduce Gerrymandering by Constraining Partisan Actors"

Abstracts

Principles and Politics: Explicit Rules Bind Lawmakers and Courts

Policymakers in America often hold power over democratic institutions, especially electoral institutions. Their decisions can place principled decision-making at odds with partisan goals, especially in polarized times. How do policymakers balance these competing interests? I argue that policymakers are more likely to side against partisan interests when the law is more explicit. I apply this to partisan gerrymandering in the United States, where map drawers can manipulate district boundaries to favor one party. This provides a hard test, where partisan interests are directly at odds with democratic principles and the stakes of any decision are high. Using new data on the 2020 redistricting cycle combined with redistricting simulations, I find that map drawers typically follow rules that protect partisan fairness. Further, if a partisan gerrymandering case is brought against a redistricting plan, courts are more likely to rule against a plan when there is an explicit law against partisan gerrymandering. When courts intervene, they consistently, but only moderately, decrease the partisan bias of the plan. I then demonstrate that compliance with other, nonpartisan redistricting rules is highest when it is easiest to measure violations.

Redistricting Reforms Reduce Gerrymandering by Constraining Partisan Actors

Political actors frequently manipulate redistricting plans to gain electoral advantages, a process commonly known as gerrymandering. To address this problem, several states have implemented institutional reforms including the establishment of map-drawing commissions. It is difficult to assess the impact of such reforms because each state structures bundles of complex rules in different ways. We propose to model redistricting processes as a sequential game. The equilibrium solution to the game summarizes multi-step institutional interactions as a single dimensional score. This score measures the leeway political actors have over the partisan lean of the final plan. Using a differences-in-differences design, we demonstrate that reforms reduce partisan bias and increase competitiveness when they constrain partisan actors. We perform a counterfactual policy analysis to estimate the partisan effects of enacting recent institutional reforms nationwide. We find that instituting redistricting commissions generally reduces the current Republican advantage, but Michigan-style reforms would yield a much greater pro-Democratic effect than types of redistricting commissions adopted in Ohio and New York.

The Applied Statistics Workshop (Gov 3009) meets all academic year, Wednesdays, 12pm-1:30pm, in CGIS K354. This workshop is a forum for advanced graduate students, faculty, and visiting scholars to present and discuss methodological or empirical work in progress in an interdisciplinary setting. The workshop features a tour of Harvard's statistical innovations and applications with weekly stops in different fields and disciplines and includes occasional presentations by invited speakers.

All interested Harvard affiliates are invited to attend.