Political Economy Workshop (Gov 3007)

Co-taught by Professors Kenneth Shepsle and Jeffry Frieden, the Research Workshop in Political Economy (Government 3007) is a year-long graduate seminar that aims to encourage cross-disciplinary research and excellence in graduate training. Political economy is a research tradition that explores how institutions affect political and economic outcomes. The workshop emphasizes the development of dissertation proposals and is a place where graduate students can present their research to an audience of committed and informed peers. It is open to graduate students in the Departments of Government and Economics, and the Program in Political Economy and Government. The workshop holds both internal and public seminars and meetings. At the internal meetings, approximately twelve per semester, graduate students and faculty present their own work to one another. At the public meetings, up to two per semester, leading scholars are invited to Harvard to present their work. Although the workshop is by invitation only, affiliates of the Weatherhead Center are encouraged to attend the public meetings. First, Nelson Guarin will present his paper: “The Real Winner’s Curse". Then, Juan Galan will have a brainstorming session on “I Obey but I Do Not Comply: State Formation in Latin America”. Abstract for “The Real Winner’s Curse" This paper shows how violence can be used to undermine electoral participation of groups that win incumbency, but have been traditionally excluded from power and have very different policy preferences to the traditional incumbent elites. Using evidence from Colombia's local elections, we study the effect on violence of the arrival of previously excluded groups (in particular, left-leaning parties) to local executive office in Colombian municipalities. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we show that while violence from left-wing guerrillas and the government is unaffected when the left wins mayoral elections, attacks by right-wing paramilitaries increase by about four per 1000 inhabitants, almost a tripling relative to the sample mean and close to 80% of a standard deviation. We interpret this increase in violence as a reaction of traditional political and economic elites trying to counteract the increase in de jure power of outsiders after they win office. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that the surge in violence is concentrated in the year of the subsequent elections and as a result left wing incumbents enjoy an incumbency de facto. We also find that the left implements land policies that are threatening to the most notorious allies of paramilitaries: large landowners. These effects highlight the unintended risks of political inclusion in societies with weak institutions, an uneven presence of the state across its territory, and features of subnational authoritarianism. Abstract for “I obey but I do not comply: State formation in Central America” In this research project I use variation in Spanish colonial institutions - which unevenly delegated power and authority to local creole elites – as a natural experiment to empirically study the colonial origins of state formation and long-run development in Central America. For identification, I will take advantage of the unique way local political offices were inherited and auctioned according to the colonial law to study how provinces that were primarily governed by creole officials as opposed to peninsular officials developed state institutions after Independence and until today. I also plan to study social norms and state capture to understand why the effects persist over time. I would like to use the brainstorming session to present the empirical strategy and data collection process, and to receive feedback on ways to move forward.