Date:
Location:
Today's Speaker
James Fearon (Stanford University), "A Theory of Elite-Initiated Democratization, Illustrated With the Case of Myanmar"
Abstract
Around half of democratic transitions are “top down" in the sense that the autocrats write the constitution that governs post-transition democracy (Albertus and Menaldo 2015). We analyze a model of elite-driven democratization, illustrating its logic and implications with the case of Myanmar. In the model, continued dictatorship is costly and inefficient due to risk of a violent rebellion and, possibly, the increase in aid, trade, and geopolitical support that would follow democratization. But the autocrats fear that fair elections would lead quickly to their marginalization. We argue, contrary to a common suggestion, that paper constitutions that provide veto points for the old elite are not by themselves sufficient protection. Top-down “democratic transitions" are really cases of power-sharing, in which the old elite retains de facto control of rent streams that the opposition cannot unilaterally seize simply by changing laws. As the military's coup threat gradually declines over time, democracy may eventually "consolidate." If the coup threat declines rapidly, and is anticipated to do so, a reversion back to autocracy is possible. We also show how the prospect of increased international aid, trade, and investment make top-down transitions more likely, though only when post-transition power-sharing is feasible.
Co-sponsored by FAS and IQSS, the Alberto Alesina Seminar on Political Economy supports research-related activities that integrate the study of economics and politics, whether by studying economic behavior in the political process or political behavior in the marketplace. In general, positive political economy is concerned with showing how observed differences among institutions affect political and economic outcomes in various social, economic, and political systems and how the institutions themselves change and develop in response to individual and collective beliefs, preferences, and strategies.
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All interested faculty and students are invited to attend.