Joyee Deb (Alesina Seminar)
Date and Time
Location
Speaker & Title
Joyee Deb (New York University), "Similarity of Information in Games"
Abstract
Algorithmic targeting increasingly exposes like-minded people to the same information. How does this homogenization affect behavior in strategic settings? We first propose a new measure of information similarity: Concentration Along the Diagonal (CAD) orders. Unlike existing stochastic orders, these compare information structures through agents' conditional beliefs about what others have seen. We show that an increase in CAD is equivalent both to higher expected welfare for inequality-averse agents and to an expanded equilibrium set in a class of binary-action coordination games. We then apply CAD to collective action, such as mass protests. More similar information is a double-edged sword: it aids coordination but exacerbates free-riding. A simple condition on primitives determines which force dominates, and hence when similarity helps or harms participation and welfare. In particular, more similar information facilitates protests against resilient regimes but can hinder protests against weak ones. We also discuss implications for censorship and for diversity in voting committees.
Co-sponsored by FAS and IQSS, the Alberto Alesina Seminar on Political Economy supports research-related activities that integrate the study of economics and politics, whether by studying economic behavior in the political process or political behavior in the marketplace. In general, positive political economy is concerned with showing how observed differences among institutions affect political and economic outcomes in various social, economic, and political systems and how the institutions themselves change and develop in response to individual and collective beliefs, preferences, and strategies.
All interested faculty and students are invited to attend.